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ABSTRACT
Over the past couple of years, anecdotal evidence has emerged link-
ing coordinated campaigns by state-sponsored actors with efforts to
manipulate public opinion on the Web, often around major political
events, through dedicated accounts, or “trolls.” Although they are
often involved in spreading disinformation on social media, there
is little understanding of how these trolls operate, what type of
content they disseminate, and most importantly their influence on
the information ecosystem.
In this paper, we shed light on these questions by analyzing 27K
tweets posted by 1K Twitter users identified as having ties with
Russia’s Internet Research Agency and thus likely state-sponsored
trolls. We compare their behavior to a random set of Twitter users,
finding interesting differences in terms of the content they dis-
seminate, the evolution of their account, as well as their general
behavior and use of Twitter. Then, using Hawkes Processes, we
quantify the influence that trolls had on the dissemination of news
on social platforms like Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan. Overall, our
findings indicate that Russian trolls managed to stay active for long
periods of time and to reach a substantial number of Twitter users
with their tweets. When looking at their ability of spreading news
content and making it viral, however, we find that their effect on
social platforms was minor, with the significant exception of news
published by the Russian state-sponsored news outlet RT (Russia
Today).
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent political events and elections have been increasingly ac-
companied by reports of disinformation campaigns attributed to
state-sponsored actors [7]. In particular, “troll farms,” allegedly
employed by Russian state agencies, have been actively comment-
ing and posting content on social media to further the Kremlin’s
political agenda [23]. In late 2017, the US Congress started an in-
vestigation on Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential
Election, releasing the IDs of 2.7K Twitter accounts identified as
Russian trolls.
Despite the growing relevance of state-sponsored disinforma-
tion, the activity of accounts linked to such efforts has not been
thoroughly studied. Previous work has mostly looked at campaigns
run by bots [7, 10, 20]; however, automated content diffusion is
only a part of the issue, and in fact recent research has shown that
human actors are actually key in spreading false information on
Twitter [21]. Overall, many aspects of state-sponsored disinforma-
tion remain unclear, e.g., how do state-sponsored trolls operate?
What kind of content do they disseminate? And, perhaps more
importantly, is it possible to quantify the influence they have on
the overall information ecosystem on the Web?
In this paper, we aim to address these questions, by relying on the
set of 2.7K accounts released by the US Congress as ground truth for
Russian state-sponsored trolls. From a dataset containing all tweets
released by the 1% Twitter Streaming API, we search and retrieve
27K tweets posted by 1K Russian trolls between January 2016 and
September 2017. We characterize their activity by comparing to a
random sample of Twitter users. Then, we quantify the influence
of these trolls on the greater Web, looking at occurrences of URLs
posted by them on Twitter, 4chan [11], and Reddit, which we choose
since they are impactful actors of the information ecosystem [29].
Finally, we use Hawkes Processes [15] to model the influence of
each Web community (i.e., Russian trolls on Twitter, overall Twitter,
Reddit, and 4chan) on each other.
Main findings. Our study leads to several key observations:
(1) Trolls actually bear very small influence in making news go
viral on Twitter and other social platforms alike. A notewor-
thy exception are links to news originating from RT (Russia
Today), a state-funded news outlet: indeed, Russian trolls are
quite effective in “pushing” these URLs on Twitter and other
social networks.
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(2) The main topics discussed by Russian trolls target very spe-
cific world events (e.g., Charlottesville protests) and organi-
zations (such as ISIS), and political threads related to Donald
Trump and Hillary Clinton.
(3) Trolls adopt different identities over time, i.e., they “reset”
their profile by deleting their previous tweets and changing
their screen name/information.
(4) Trolls exhibit significantly different behaviors compared to
other (random) Twitter accounts. For instance, the locations
they report concentrate in a few countries like the USA,
Germany, and Russia, perhaps in an attempt to appear “local”
andmore effectively manipulate opinions of users from those
countries. Also, while random Twitter users mainly tweet
from mobile versions of the platform, the majority of the
Russian trolls do so via the Web Client.
2 DATASETS
Russian trolls.We start from the 2.7K Twitter accounts suspended
by Twitter because of connections to Russia’s Internet Research
Agency. The list of these accounts was released by the US Congress
as part of their investigation of the alleged Russian interference
in the 2016 US presidential election, and includes both Twitter’s
user ID (which is a numeric unique identifier associated to the
account) and the screen name.1 From a dataset storing all tweets
released by the 1% Twitter Streaming API, we search for tweets
posted between January 2016 and September 2017 by the user IDs
of the trolls. Overall, we obtain 27K tweets from 1K out of the 2.7K
Russian trolls. Note that the criteria used by Twitter to identify
these troll accounts are not public. What we do know is that this is
not the complete set of active Russian trolls, because 6 days prior to
this writing Twitter announced they have discovered over 1K more
troll accounts.2 Nonetheless, it constitutes an invaluable “ground
truth” dataset enabling efforts to shed light on the behavior of
state-sponsored troll accounts.
Baseline dataset.We also compile a list of random Twitter users,
while ensuring that the distribution of the average number of tweets
per day posted by the random users is similar to the one by trolls.
To calculate the average number of tweets posted by an account,
we find the first tweet posted after January 1, 2016 and retrieve the
overall tweet count. This number is then divided by the number of
days since account creation. Having selected a set of 1K random
users, we then collect all their tweets between January 2016 and
September 2017, obtaining a total of 96K tweets. We follow this
approach as it gives a good approximation of posting behavior,
even though it might not be perfect, since (1) Twitter accounts can
become more or less active over time, and (2) our datasets are based
on the 1% Streaming API, thus, we are unable to control the number
of tweets we obtain for each account.
3 ANALYSIS
Temporal analysis. We observe that Russian trolls are continu-
ously active on Twitter between January, 2016 and September, 2017,
with a peak of activity just before the second US presidential debate
(October 9, 2016). Fig. 1(a) shows that most tweets from the trolls
1See https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/exhibit_b.pdf
2https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/
2016-election-update.html
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Figure 1: Temporal characteristics of tweets from Russian
trolls and random Twitter users.
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Figure 2: Number of Russian troll accounts created per day.
are posted between 14:00 and 15:00 UTC. In Fig. 1(b), we also report
temporal characteristics based on hour of the week, finding that
both datasets follow a diurnal pattern, while trolls’ activity peaks
around 14:00 and 15:00 UTC on Mondays and Wednesdays. Con-
sidering that Moscow is three hours ahead UTC, this distribution
does not rule out that tweets might actually be posted from Russia.
Account creation. Next, we examine the dates when the trolls
infiltrated Twitter, by looking at the account creation dates. From
Fig. 2, we observe that 71% of them are actually created before 2016.
There are some interesting peaks, during 2016 and 2017: for instance,
24 accounts are created on July 12, 2016, approx. a week before the
Republican National Convention (when Donald Trump received
the nomination), while 28 appear on August 8, 2017, a few days
before the infamous Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville. Taken
together, this might be evidence of coordinated activities aimed at
manipulating users’ opinions with respect to specific events.
Account characteristics.We also shed light on the troll account
profile information. In Table 1, we report the top ten words appear-
ing in the screen names and the descriptions of Russian trolls, as
well as character 4-grams for screen names and word bigrams for
profile descriptions. Interestingly, a substantial number of Russian
trolls pose as news outlets, evident from the use of the term “news”
in both the screen name (1.3%) and the description (10.7%). Also, it
seems they attempt to increase the number of their followers, thus
their reach of Twitter users, by nudging users to follow them (see,
e.g., “follow me” appearing in almost 8% of the accounts). Finally,
10.3% of the Russian trolls describe themselves as Trump supporters:
“trump” and “maga” (Make America Great Again, one of Trump
campaign’s main slogans).
Language. Looking at the language (as provided via the Twitter
API) of the tweets posted by Russian trolls, we find that most of
them (61%) are in English, although a substantial portion are in
Russian (27%), and to a lesser extent in German (3.5%). In Fig. 3(a),
we plot the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the number
of different languages for each user: 64% of the Russian trolls post
all their tweets in only one language, compared to only 54% for
random users. Overall, by comparing the two distributions, we
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Screen Name Description
Word (%) 4-gram (%) Word (%) Word bigram (%)
news 1.3% news 1.5% news 10.7% follow me 7.8%
bote 1.2% line 1.5% follow 10.7% breaking news 2.6%
online 1.1% blac 1.3% conservative 8.1% news aus 2.1%
daily 0.8% bote 1.3% trump 7.8% uns in 2.1%
today 0.6% rist 1.1% und 6.2% deiner stdt 2.1%
ezekiel2517 0.6% nlin 1.1% maga 5.9% die news 2.1%
maria 0.5% onli 1.0% love 5.8% wichtige und 2.1%
black 0.5% lack 1.0% us 5.3% nachrichten aus 2.1%
voice 0.4% bert 1.0% die 5.0% aus deiner 2.1%
martin 0.4% poli 1.0% nachrichten 4.3% die dn 2.1%
Table 1: Top 10 words found in Russian troll screen names
and account descriptions. We also report character 4-grams
for the screen names and word bigrams for the description.
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Figure 3: CDF of number of (a) languages used (b) clients
used per user.
Client (Trolls) (%) Client (Baseline) (%)
Twitter Web Client 50.1% TweetDeck 32.6%
twitterfeed 13.4% Twitter for iPhone 26.2%
Twibble.io 9.0% Twitter for Android 22.6%
IFTTT 8.6% Twitter Web Client 6.1%
TweetDeck 8.3% GrabInbox 2.0%
NovaPress 4.6% Twitter for iPad 1.4%
dlvr.it 2.3% IFTTT 1.0%
Twitter for iPhone 0.8% twittbot.net 0.9%
Zapier.com 0.6% Twitter for BlackBerry 0.6%
Twitter for Android 0.6% Mobile Web (M2) 0.4%
Table 2: Top 10 Twitter clients (as % of tweets).
observe that random Twitter users tend to use more languages in
their tweets compared to the trolls.
Client. Finally, we analyze the clients used to post tweets. We do
so since previous work [5] shows that the client used by official
or professional accounts are quite different that the ones used by
regular users. Table 2 reports the top 10 clients for both Russian
trolls and baseline users. We find the latter prefer to use Twitter
clients for mobile devices (48%) and the TweetDeck dashboard
(32%), whereas, the former mainly use the Web client (50%). We also
assess how many different clients Russian trolls use throughout
our dataset: in Fig. 3(b), we plot the CDF of the number of clients
used per user. We find that 65% of the Russian trolls use only one
client, 28% of them two different clients, and the rest more than
three, which is overall less than the random baseline users.
Location.We then study users’ location, relying on the self-reported
location field in their profiles. Note that users not only may leave it
empty, but also change it any time they like, so we look at locations
for each tweet. We retrieve it for 75% of the tweets by Russian trolls,
gathering 261 different entries, which we convert to a physical
location using the Google Maps Geocoding API. In the end, we
obtain 178 unique locations for the trolls, as depicted in Fig. 4 (red
Figure 4: Distribution of reported locations for tweets by
Russian trolls (red circles) and baseline (green triangles).
Trolls Baseline
Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%)
news 7.2% US 0.7% iHeartAwards 1.8% UrbanAttires 0.6%
politics 2.6% tcot 0.6% BestFanArmy 1.6% Vacature 0.6%
sports 2.1% PJNET 0.6% Harmonizers 1.0% mPlusPlaces 0.6%
business 1.4% entertainment 0.5% iOSApp 0.9% job 0.5%
money 1.3% top 0.5% JouwBaan 0.9% Directioners 0.5%
world 1.2% topNews 0.5% vacature 0.9% JIMIN 0.5%
MAGA 0.8% ISIS 0.4% KCA 0.9% PRODUCE101 0.5%
health 0.8% Merkelmussbleiben 0.4% Psychic 0.8% VoteMainFPP 0.5%
local 0.7% IslamKills 0.4% RT 0.8% Werk 0.4%
BlackLivesMatter 0.7% breaking 0.4% Libertad2016 0.6% dts 0.4%
Table 3: Top 20 hashtags in tweets from Russian trolls and
baseline users.
circles). The size of the circles on the map indicates the number of
tweets that appear at each location. We do the same for the baseline,
getting 2,037 different entries, converted by the API to 894 unique
locations. We observe that most of the tweets from Russian trolls
come from locations within the USA and Russia, and some from
European countries, like Germany, Belgium, and Italy. On the other
hand, tweets in our baseline are more uniformly distributed across
the globe, with many tweets from North and South America, Eu-
rope, and Asia. This suggests that Russian trolls may be pretending
to be from certain countries, e.g., USA or Germany, aiming to pose
as locals and better manipulate opinions. This explanation becomes
more plausible when we consider that a plurality of trolls’ tweets
have their location set as a generic form of “US,” as opposed to a
specific city, state, or even region. Interestingly, the 2nd, 3rd, and
4th most popular location for trolls to tweet from are Moscow, St.
Petersburg, and a generic form of “Russia.” We also assess whether
users change their country of origin based on the self-reported
location: only a negligible percentage (1%) of trolls change their
country, while for the baseline the percentage is 16%.
Media. We then assess whether Russian trolls use images and
videos in a different way than random baseline users. For Russian
trolls (resp., baseline accounts), 66% (resp., 73%) of the tweets include
no images, 32% (resp., 18%) exactly one image, and 2% (resp., 9%)
more than one. This suggests that Russian trolls disseminate a
considerable amount of information via single-image tweets. As
for videos, only 1.5% of the tweets from Russian trolls includes a
video, as opposed to 6.4% for baseline accounts.
Hashtags. Our next step is to study the use of hashtags in tweets.
Russian trolls use at least one hashtag in 32% of their tweets, com-
pared to 10% for the baseline. Overall, we find 4.3K and 7.1K unique
hashtags for trolls and random users, respectively, with 74% and
78% of them only appearing once. In Table 3, we report the top 20
hashtags for both datasets. Trolls appear to use hashtags to dissem-
inate news (7.2%) and politics (2.6%) related content, but also use
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Trolls Baseline
Mention (%) Mention (%) Mention (%) Mention (%)
leprasorium 2.1% postsovet 0.4% TasbihIstighfar 0.3% RasSpotlights 0.1%
zubovnik 0.8% DLGreez 0.4% raspotlights 0.2% GenderReveals 0.1%
realDonaldTrump 0.6% DanaGeezus 0.4% FunnyBrawls 0.2% TattedChanel 0.1%
midnight 0.6% ruopentwit 0.3% YouTube 0.2% gemvius 0.1%
blicqer 0.6% Spoontamer 0.3% Harry_Styles 0.2% DrizzyNYC__ 0.1%
gloed_up 0.6% YouTube 0.3% shortdancevids 0.2% August_Alsina_ 0.1%
wylsacom 0.5% ChrixMorgan 0.3% UrbanAttires 0.2% RihannaBITCH_ 0.1%
TalibKweli 0.4% sergeylazarev 0.3% BTS_twt 0.2% sexualfeed 0.1%
zvezdanews 0.4% RT_com 0.3% KylieJenner_NYC 0.2% PetsEvery30 0.1%
GiselleEvns 0.4% kozheed 0.3% BaddiessNation 0.2% IGGYAZALEAoO 0.1%
Table 4: Top 20 mentions in tweets from trolls and baseline.
several that might be indicators of propaganda and/or controversial
topics, e.g., #ISIS, #IslamKills, and #BlackLivesMatter. For instance,
we find some notable examples including: “We just have to close the
borders, ‘refugees’ are simple terrorists #IslamKills” on March 22,
2016, “#SyrianRefugees ARE TERRORISTS from #ISIS #IslamKills”
on March 22, 2016, and “WATCH: Here is a typical #BlackLivesMat-
ter protester: ‘I hope I kill all white babes!’ #BatonRouge <url>” on
July 17, 2016.
We also study when these hashtags are used by the trolls, finding
that most of them are well distributed over time. However, there
are some interesting exceptions, e.g., with #Merkelmussbleiben
(a hashtag seemingly supporting Angela Merkel) and #IslamKills.
Specifically, tweets with the former appear exclusively on July 21,
2016, while the latter onMarch 22, 2016, when a terrorist attack took
place at Brussels airport. These two examples illustrate how the
trolls may be coordinating to push specific narratives on Twitter.
Mentions.We find that 46% of trolls’ tweets include mentions to
8.5K unique Twitter users. This percentage is much higher for the
random baseline users (80%, to 41K users). Table 4 reports the 20 top
mentions we find in tweets from Russian trolls and baseline users.
We find several Russian accounts, like ‘leprasorium’ (a popular Rus-
sian account that mainly posts memes) in 2% of the mentions, as
well as popular politicians like ‘realDonaldTrump’ (0.6%). The prac-
tice of mentioning politicians on Twitter may reflect an underlying
strategy to mutate users’ opinions regarding a particular political
topic, which has been also studied in previous work [2].
URLs.We then analyze the URLs included in the tweets. First of
all, we note that 53% of the trolls’ tweets include at least a URL,
compared to only 27% for the random baseline. There is an extensive
presence of URL shorteners for both datasets, e.g., bit.ly (12% for
trolls and 26% for the baseline) and ift.tt (10% for trolls and 2% for the
baseline), therefore, in November 2017, we visit each URL to obtain
the final URL after all redirections. In Fig. 5, we plot the CDF of the
number of URLs per unique domain. We observe that Russian trolls
disseminate more URLs in their tweets compared to the baseline.
This might indicate that Russian trolls include URLs to increase
their credibility and positive user perception; indeed, [9] show that
adding a URL in a tweet correlates with higher credibility scores.
Also, in Table 5, we report the top 20 domains for both Russian
trolls and the baseline. Most URLs point to content within Twitter
itself; 13% and 35%, respectively. Links to a number of popular social
networks like YouTube (1.8% and 4.2%, respectively) and Instagram
(1.5% and 1.9%) appear in both datasets. We also note that among the
top 20 domains, there are also a number of news outlets linked from
trolls’ tweets, e.g., Washington Post (0.7%), Seattle Times (0.7%),
and state-sponsored news outlets like RT (0.8%) in trolls’ tweets,
but much less so from the baseline.
Domain (Trolls) (%) Domain (Baseline) (%)
twitter.com 12.81% twitter.com 35.51%
reportsecret.com 7.02% youtube.com 4.21%
riafan.ru 3.42% vine.co 3.94%
politexpert.net 2.10% factissues.com 3.24%
youtube.com 1.88% blogspot.com.cy 1.92%
vk.com 1.58% instagram.com 1.90%
instagram.com 1.53% facebook.com 1.68%
yandex.ru 1.50% worldstarr.info 1.47%
infreactor.org 1.36% trendytopic.info 1.39%
cbslocal.com 1.35% minibird.jp 1.25%
Table 5: Top 10 domains in tweets from trolls and the base-
line.
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Figure 5: CDF of number of URLs per domain.
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Figure 6: CDF of sentiment and subjectivity scores for tweets
of Russian trolls and random users.
Sentiment analysis. Next, we assess the sentiment and subjectiv-
ity of each tweet for both datasets. Fig. 6(a) plots the CDF of the
sentiment scores of tweets posted by Russian trolls and our baseline
users. We observe that 30% of the tweets from Russian trolls have
a positive sentiment, and 18% negative. These scores are not too
distant from those of random users where 36% are positive and 16%
negative, however, Russian trolls exhibit a unique behavior in terms
of sentiment, as a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test unveils
significant differences between the distributions (p < 0.01). Overall,
we observe that Russian trolls tend to be more negative/neutral,
while our baseline is more positive. We also compare subjectivity
scores (Fig. 6(b)), finding that tweets from trolls tend to be more sub-
jective; again, we perform significance tests revealing differences
between the two distributions (p < 0.01).
LDA analysis.We also use the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
model to analyze tweets’ semantics. We train an LDA model for
each of the datasets and extract 10 distinct topics with 10 words,
as reported in Table 6. Overall, topics from Russian trolls refer
to specific world events (e.g., Charlottesville) as well as specific
news related to politics (e.g., North Korea and Donald Trump). By
contrast, topics extracted from the random sample are more general
(e.g., tweets regarding birthdays).
Screen name changes. Previous work [17] has shown that mali-
cious accounts often change their screen name in order to assume
different identifies. Therefore, we investigate whether trolls show
a similar behavior, as they might change the narrative with which
they are attempting to influence public opinion. Indeed, we find that
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Topic Terms (Trolls) Topic Terms (Baseline)
1 trump, black, people, really, one, enlist, truth, work, can, get 1 want, can, just, follow, now, get, see, don, love, will
2 trump, year, old, just, run, obama, breaking, will, news, police 2 2016, july, come, https, trump, social, just, media, jabberduck, get
3 new, trump, just, breaking, obamacare, one, sessions, senate, politics, york 3 happy, best, make, birthday, video, days, come, back, still, little
4 man, police, news, killed, shot, shooting, woman, dead, breaking, death 4 know, never, get, love, just, night, one, give, time, can
5 trump, media, tcot, just, pjnet, war, like, video, post, hillary 5 just, can, everyone, think, get, white, fifth, veranomtv2016, harmony, friends
6 sports, video, game, music, isis, charlottesville, will, new, health, amb 6 good, like, people, lol, don, just, look, today, said, keep
7 can, don, people, want, know, see, black, get, just, like 7 summer, seconds, team, people, miss, don, will, photo, veranomtv2016, new
8 trump, clinton, politics, hillary, video, white, donald, president, house, calls 8 like, twitter, https, first, can, get, music, better, wait, really
9 news, world, money, business, new, one, says, state, 2016, peace 9 dallas, right, fuck, vote, police, via, just, killed, teenchoice, aldubmainecelebration
10 now, trump, north, korea, people, right, will, check, just, playing 10 day, black, love, thank, great, new, now, matter, can, much
Table 6: Terms extracted from LDA topics of tweets from Russian trolls and baseline users.
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Figure 7: CDF of the number of (a) followers/friends for
each tweet and (b) increase in followers/friends for each user
from the first to the last tweet.
9% of the accounts operated by trolls change their screen name, up
to 4 times during the course of our dataset. Some examples include
changing screen names from “OnlineHouston” to “HoustonTop-
News,” or “Jesus Quintin Perez” to “WorldNewsPolitics,” in a clear
attempt to pose as news-related accounts. In our baseline, we find
that 19% of the accounts changed their Twitter screen names, up
to 11 times during our dataset; highlighting that changing screen
names is a common behavior of Twitter users in general.
Followers/Friends. Next, we look at the number of followers and
friends (i.e., the accounts one follows) of the Russian trolls, as this
is an indication of the overall impact of a tweet. In Fig. 7(a), we plot
the CDF of the number of followers per tweet measured at the time
of that tweet. On average, Russian trolls have 7K followers and 3K
friends, while our baseline has 25K followers and 6K friends.We also
note that in both samples, tweets reached a large number of Twitter
users; at least 1K followers, with peaks up to 145K followers. These
results highlight that Russian trolls have a non-negligible number of
followers, which can assist in pushing specific narratives to a much
greater number of Twitter users. We also assess the evolution of the
Russian trolls in terms of the number of their followers and friends.
To this end, we get the follower and friend count for each user on
their first and last tweet and calculate the difference. Fig. 7(b) plots
the CDF of the increase/decrease of the followers and friends for
each troll as well as random user in our baseline. We observe that,
on average, Russian trolls increase their number of followers and
friends by 2,065 and 1,225, respectively, whereas for the baseline
we observe an increase of 425 and 133 for followers and friends,
respectively. This suggests that Russian trolls work hard to increase
their reachability within Twitter.
Tweet Deletion. Arguably, a reasonable strategy to avoid detec-
tion after posting tweets that aim to manipulate other users might
be to delete them. This is particularly useful when troll accounts
change their identity and need to modify the narrative that they
use to influence public opinion. With each tweet, the Streaming API
returns the total number of available tweets a user has up to that
time. Retrieving this count allows us to observe if a user has deleted
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Figure 8: CDF of the number of deleted tweets per observe
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Figure 9: Average percentage of observed deletions per
month.
a tweet, and around what period; we call this an “observed deletion.”
Recall that our dataset is based on the 1% sample of Twitter, thus,
we can only estimate, in a conservative way, how many tweets are
deleted; specifically, in between subsequent tweets, a user may have
deleted and posted tweets that we do not observe. In Fig. 8, we plot
the CDF of the number of deleted tweets per observed deletion. We
observe that 13% of the Russian trolls delete some of their tweets,
with a median percentage of tweet deletion equal to 9.7%. Whereas,
for the baseline set, 27% of the accounts delete at least one tweet,
but the median percentage is 0.1%. This means that the trolls delete
their tweets in batches, possibly trying to cover their tracks or get
a clean slate, while random users make a larger number of dele-
tions but only a small percentage of their overall tweets, possibly
because of typos. We also report the distribution, over each month,
of tweet deletions in Fig. 9. Specifically, we report the mean of the
percentages for all observed deletions in our datasets. Most of the
tweets from Russian trolls are deleted in October 2016, suggesting
that these accounts attempted to get a clean slate a few months
before the 2016 US elections.
Case Study.While the previous results provide a quantitative char-
acterization of Russian trolls behavior, we believe there is value
showing a concrete example of the behavior exhibited and how
techniques played out. We start on May 15, 2016, where the troll
with screen name ‘Pen_Air’, was posing as a news account via its
profile description: “National American news.” On September 8,
2016 as the US presidential elections approached, ‘Pen_Air’ became
a Trump supporter, changing its screen name to ‘Blacks4DTrump’
with a profile description of “African-Americans stand with Trump
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/pol/ Reddit Twitter Trolls
URLs Russian state-sponsored 6 13 19 19
Other news sources 47 168 159 192
All 127 482 861 989
Events Russian state-sponsored 19 42 118 19
Other news sources 720 3,055 2,930 195
All 1,685 9,531 1,537,612 1,461
Mean λ0 Russian state-sponsored 0.0824 0.1865 0.2264 0.1228
Other news sources 0.0421 0.1447 0.1544 0.0663
All 0.0324 0.1557 0.1553 0.0753
Table 7: Total URLs with at least one event in Twitter, /pol/,
Reddit, and Russian trolls on Twitter; total events for Rus-
sian state-sponsored news URLs, other news URLs and all
the URLs; andmean background rate (λ0) for each platform.
to make America Great Again!” Over the next 11 months, the ac-
count’s tweet count grew from 49 to 642 while its follower count
rose from 1.2K to nearly 9K. Then, around August 18, 2017, the ac-
count was seemingly repurposed. Almost all of its previous tweets
were deleted (the account’s tweet count dropped to 35), it gained
a new screen name (‘southlonestar2’), and was now posing as a
“Proud American and TEXAN patriot! Stop ISLAM and PC. Don’t
mess with Texas” according to its profile description. When ex-
amining the accounts tweets, we see that most are clearly related
to politics, featuring blunt right-wing attacks and “talking points.”
For example, “Mr. Obama! Maybe you bring your girls and leave
them in the bathroom with a grown man! #bathroombill #NObama
<url>” on May 15, 2016, “#HiLIARy has only two faces! And I hate
both! #NeverHillary #Hillaryliesmatter <url>” on May 19, 2016,
and “RT @TEN_GOP: WikiLeaks #DNCLeaks confirms something
we all know: system is totally rigged! #NeverHillary <url>.” on July
22, 2016.
Take-aways. In summary, our analysis leads to the following ob-
servations. First, we find evidence that trolls were actively involved
in the dissemination of content related to world news and politics,
as well as propaganda content regarding various topics such as
ISIS and Islam. Moreover, several Russian trolls were created or
repurposed a few weeks before notable world events, including
the Republican National Convention meeting or the Charlottesville
rally. We also find that the trolls deleted a substantial amount of
tweets in batches and overall made substantial changes to their ac-
counts during the course of their lifespan. Specifically, they changed
their screen names aiming to pose as news outlets, experienced
significant rises in the numbers of followers and friends, etc. Fur-
thermore, our location analysis shows that Russian trolls might
have tried to manipulate users located in the USA, Germany, and
possibly in their own country (i.e., Russia), by appearing to be lo-
cated in those countries. Finally, the fact that these accounts were
active up until their recent suspension also highlights the need to
develop more effective tools to detect such actors.
4 INFLUENCE ESTIMATION
Thus far, we have analyzed the behavior of the Russian trolls on
the Twitter platform, and how this differs from that of a baseline of
random users. Allegedly, their main goal is to ultimately manipulate
the opinion of other users and extend the cascade of disinformation
they share (e.g., other users post similar content) [4]. Therefore, we
now set out to shed light on their impact, in terms of the dissemi-
nation of disinformation, on Twitter and on the greater Web.
To assess their influence, we look at the URLs posted by four
groups of users: Russian trolls on Twitter, “normal” accounts on
Twitter, Reddit users, and 4chan users (/pol/ board). For each unique
URL, we fit a statistical model known as Hawkes Processes [15, 16],
which allows us to estimate the strength of connections between
each of these four groups in terms of how likely an event – the
URL being posted by either trolls or normal users to a particular
platform – is to cause subsequent events in each of the groups. For
example, a strong connection from Reddit to /pol/ would mean that
a URL that appears on Reddit is likely to be seen and then re-posted
on /pol/; whereas, a weak connection from trolls to normal users
on Twitter indicates that a URL posted by trolls is less likely to be
re-tweeted or re-posted by the latter. We fit the Hawkes Processes
using the methodology presented by [29].
To study the dissemination of different types of content, we look
at three different sets of URLs: 1) The complete set of all URLs
posted by Russian trolls; 2) The subset of URLs for Russian state-
sponsored news, namely, RT (Russia Today); and 3) The subset of
URLs from other mainstream and alternative news sources using
the list provided by [29]. Table 7 summarizes the number of URLs,
number of events (i.e., occurrences of a given URL) as well as the
mean background rate for each category and social network. The
background rate defines the rate at which events occur excluding
the influence of the platforms included in themodel; the background
rate includes events created spontaneously on each platform, such
as by a user sharing the article from the original source, or those
generated by another platform not monitored by us like Facebook.
The number of events for Russian state-sponsored news sources
is substantially lower than the number of events from other news
sources. This is expected since the former only includes one news
source (RT), however, it is interesting that the background rates for
these URLs are higher than for other news sources, meaning that
events from Russian state-sponsored news are more likely to occur
spontaneously.
Fitting a Hawkes model yields a weight matrix, which character-
izes the strength of the connections between the groups we study.
Each weight value represents the connection strength from one
group to another and can be interpreted as the expected number of
subsequent events that will occur on the second group after each
event on the first. The mean weight values over all URLs, as well as
for the URLs from RT and other news URLs, are presented in Fig. 10.
We observe that for /pol/, Reddit, and normal users on Twitter,
the greatest weights are from each group to itself, meaning that
reposts/retweets on the same site are more common than sharing
the URL to the other platforms (Fig. 10(a)). For the Russian Trolls
on Twitter, however, the weight is greater from the trolls to Twitter
than from the trolls to themselves, perhaps reflecting their use as
an avenue for disseminating information to normal Twitter users
(Fig. 10(b)). Also, we observe that, in most cases, the connections are
stronger for non-Russia state-sponsored news, indicating that regu-
lar users are more inclined to share news articles from mainstream
and alternative news sources.
Looking at the Russian trolls and normal Twitter users, we see
that the trolls are more likely to retweet Russian state-sponsored
URLs from normal Twitter users than other news sources; con-
versely, normal Twitter users are more likely to retweet Russian
state-sponsored URLs from the troll accounts. In order to assess the
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Figure 10: Mean weights for (a) all URLs in our dataset and
(b) news URLs categorized as Russian state-sponsored (R)
and other mainstream and alternative news URLs (O). We
also show the percent of increase/decrease between the two
categories. Note that * and ** refer to statistical significance
with, resp., p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
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Figure 11: Estimated mean percentages of events created be-
cause of other events for (a) all URLs and (b) Russian state-
sponsored URLs (R) and other mainstream and alternative
news URLs (O).We also show the difference between the two
categories of news.
significance of our results, we perform two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests on the weight distributions for the RT URLs and the
other newsURLs for each source-destination platform pair (depicted
as stars in the Fig. 10(b)). Small p value means there is a statistically
significant difference in the way that RT URLs propagate from the
source to the destination platform. Most of the source-destination
pairs have no statistical significance, however for the Russian trolls–
Twitter users pair, we find significance difference with p < 0.01.
In Fig. 11, we report the estimated total impact for each pair
of platforms, for both Russian state-sponsored news, other news
sources as well as all the observed URLs. We determine the impact
by calculating, based on the estimated weights and the number of
events, the percentage of events on a destination platform caused
by events on a source platform, following the same methodology
as [29]. For all URLs (Fig. 11(a)), we find that the influence of Rus-
sian trolls is negligible on Twitter (0.01%), while for /pol/ and Reddit
it is slightly higher (0.93% and 0.62%, respectively). For other pairs,
the larger impacts are between Reddit–/pol/ and Twitter-Russian
trolls, mainly due to the larger population of users. Looking at the
estimated impact for RT and other news sources (Fig. 11(b)), we
note that the trolls influenced the other platforms approximately
the same for alternative and mainstream news sources (0.72%, 0.62%,
and 0.61 for /pol/, Reddit, and Twitter, respectively). Interestingly,
Russian trolls have a much larger impact on all the other platforms
for the RT news when compared to the other news sources: approx-
imately 2 times more on /pol/, 5 times more on Reddit, and 4 times
more on Twitter.
Take-aways. Using Hawkes processes, we were able to assess the
degree of influence Russian trolls had on Twitter, Reddit, and /pol/
by examining the diffusion of information via URLs to news. Our
results indicate that their influence is actually quite limited. With
the exception of news originating from the Russian state-sponsored
news outlet RT, the troll accounts were generally less influential
than other users on Reddit, Twitter, and 4chan. However, our analy-
sis is based only on 1K troll accounts found in Twitter’s 1% stream,
and, as mentioned previously, Twitter recently announced they had
discovered over 1K more trolls and more than 50K automated ac-
counts. With that in mind, there are several potential explanations
behind this limited influence. For example, there might be a lot of
influence attributed to regular Twitter users that belongs to newly
announced troll accounts. Considering that Twitter announced the
discovery of “only” 1K more troll accounts, we suspect that this
is not really the case. Another, more plausible explanation is that
the troll accounts are just not terribly efficient at spreading news,
and instead are more concerned with causing havoc by pushing
ideas, engaging other users, or even taking both sides of contro-
versial online discussions [22]. This scenario makes more sense
considering that, along with 1K new troll accounts, Twitter also
announced discovering over 50K automated accounts that might
be more efficient in terms of driving traffic to specific URLs.
5 RELATEDWORK
Opinion manipulation. The practice of swaying opinion on the
Web is a long-standing issue as malicious actors attempt to push
their agenda. Kumar et al. [13] study how users create multiple
accounts, called sockpuppets, that participate in Web communities
to manipulate users’ opinions. They find that sockpuppets exhibit
different posting behavior when compared to benign users. Mi-
haylov et al. [18] show that trolls can manipulate users’ opinions in
forums, while in their follow-up work [19] they highlight the two
types of manipulation trolls: those paid to operate and those that
are called out as such by other users. Then, Volkova and Bell [26]
predict the deletion of Twitter accounts because they are trolls, fo-
cusing on those that shared content related to the Russian-Ukraine
crisis.Elyashar et al. [6] distinguish authentic discussions from cam-
paigns to manipulate the public’s opinion, using a set of similarity
functions alongside historical data. Also, Steward et al. [22] focus
on discussions related to the Black Lives Matter movement and how
content from Russian trolls was retweeted by other users. Using the
retweet network, they find the existence of two communities; one
left- and one right-leaning communities. Also, they note that trolls
infiltrated both communities, setting out to push specific narratives.
Finally, Varol et al. [25] aim to identify memes that become popu-
lar due to coordinated efforts, and achieve 75% AUC score before
memes become trending and 95% AUC score afterwards.
False information on the political stage. Conover et al. [2]
study the interactions of right- and left-leaning communities on
Twitter during the 2010 US midterm elections: finding that the
retweet network has limited connectivity between the two com-
munities, which does not happen in the mentions network; mainly
because users engage others users with different ideologies and ex-
pose them to different opinions. Ratkiewicz et al. [20] use machine
learning to detect the early stages of false political information
spreading on Twitter and introduce a framework that considers
topological, content-based, and crowdsourced features of the in-
formation diffusion. Wong et al. [27] quantify political leaning of
users and news outlets during the 2012 US presidential election
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on Twitter by using an inference engine that considers tweeting
and retweeting behavior of articles. Yang et al. [28] investigate the
topics of discussions on Twitter for 51 US political persons showing
that Democrats and Republicans are active in a similar way on Twit-
ter. Le et al. [14] study 50M tweets regarding the 2016 US election
primaries and highlight the importance of three factors in political
discussions on social media, namely the party, policy considerations,
and personality of the candidates. Howard and Kollanyi [12] study
the role of bots in Twitter conversations during the 2016 Brexit
referendum. By analyzing 1.5M tweets, they find that most tweets
are in favor of Brexit and that there are bots with various levels of
automation.Also, Hegelich and Janetzko [10] highlight that bots
have a political agenda and that they exhibit various behaviors,
e.g., trying to hide their identity and promoting topics through
hashtags and retweets. Finally, a large body of work focuses on
social bots [1, 3, 7, 8, 24] and their role in spreading disinformation,
highlighting that they can manipulate the public’s opinion at large
scale, thus potentially affecting the outcome of political elections.
Remarks. Unlike previous work, our study focuses on the set of
Russian troll accounts that were suspended by Twitter and released
by the US congress. To the best of our knowledge, this constitutes
the first effort not only to characterize a ground truth of troll ac-
counts independently identified by Twitter, but also to quantify
their influence on the greater Web, specifically, on Twitter as well
as on Reddit and 4chan.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed the behavior and use of the Twitter
platform by Russian trolls during the course of 21 months. We
showed that Russian trolls exhibited interesting differences when
compared with a set of random users, actively disseminated politics-
related content, adopted multiple identities during their account’s
lifespan, and that they aimed to increase their impact on Twitter by
increasing their followers. Also, we quantified the influence that
Russian trolls have on Twitter, Reddit, and /pol/ using a statistical
model known as Hawkes Processes. Our findings show that trolls’
influence was not substantial with respect to the other platforms,
with the significant exception of news published by the Russian
state-sponsored news outlet RT.
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